组织惯例演化的博弈分析

随着全球经济系统的日趋复杂和快速变化,持续性变革已经成为企业生存和发展的内在需要.组织惯例作为组织行为的基本要素和组织能力的载体,可以反映企业内在的深层变革.运用生物学隐喻,深入剖析了企业演化的机制;并在此基础上,运用演化博弈模型对组织惯例演化的路径选择进行了模拟分析;最后探讨了组织惯例演化的主要影响因素,并通过案例研究,对演化博弈模型进行了例证.     

基于远期合约的电力市场博弈分析

通过建立零售商与发电厂商之间的远期合约博弈模型,分析在发电和售电分开的电力市场模式下,零售商与发电厂商之间的远期合约在抑制发电厂商寡头垄断方面的作用.研究表明:在零售竞争的市场中,零售商采用激励策略主动与发电厂商签订远期合约,从而实现零售商自身利润最优化的目标,并在一定程度上减少了发电厂商的垄断利润,同时零售商的这种主动策略行为还能促进社会福利最大化的实现.这些分析为今后我国电力市场改革和电力金融衍生产品的创新提供了理论参考.     

基于合作博弈的非常规突发极端洪水灾害风险应急金融服务供应链协调

根据非常规突发极端洪水灾害风险的特点,从服务供应链视角,提出非常规突发极端洪水灾害风险应急金融服务供应链的管理框架,分析此供应链的结构和内涵.分析此应急金融服务供应链中各参与人的利益关系式与和谐阈值,利用合作博弈理论,建立基于传统Shapley值合作博弈模型,有效解决应急金融服务供应链中成员经营性政府、保险公司和公众三者之间的协调问题.     

不同信息条件下创新联盟合作伙伴的选择——基于知识获取的研究视角

以知识获取为研究视角,应用动态博弈理论,研究了不同信息条件下创新联盟合作伙伴选择的问题.通过研究发现,在信息对称条件下,知识共享成本越低或者知识获取能力越高,越容易实现帕累托改进;在信息非对称条件下,企业的合作成本、知识获取能力影响了分离均衡区间的范围,并进而影响帕累托效率与逆向选择风险的大小.     

具有不完全信息的内部交易动态博弈

在Kyle模型中的线性均衡假设进行了修正的基础上,针对内部交易者只具有资产价值不完全信息情况,建立两期风险厌恶型内部交易均衡模型,并求得该模型的子博弈纳什均衡解.由此发现资产价值不完信息中噪音对市场干扰程度愈小(波动程度愈小),就愈有利于内部交易者的收益;内部交易者的交易就愈活跃;交易均衡价格包含资产价值信息就愈多.     

基于提前期压缩的供应链三方利益博弈

讨论基于提前期压缩的供应链利益协调问题。供应商采用批量分解方式向采购商供货,由3 PL承担运输。供应链成员通过提前期赶工压缩提前期,降低成本。基于斯坦克尔伯格博弈模型,设计一种决策原则,对采购商、供应商、3PL和系统四方成本节约情况进行比较并根据决策原则挑选出最佳方案。仿真分析讨论了相关参数变化对决策变量和各方成本节约额的影响。结论表明,三方博弈的结果倾向于选择A模式或D模式,且当采购商单位库存成本较大时,各方成本节约额随采购商订货成本变化波动较大。结论证明了基于提前期压缩的博弈决策方式的有效性。     

基于古诺博弈策略的报童问题的模型及分析

通过建立和分析基于古诺博弈策略的报童问题的数学模型,寻求两个销售商有重叠销售区域时的竞争价格策略优化方法.模型的主要特点是:基于蜂窝理论刻画每个销售商的营销区域呈正六边形,分析了相邻销售商有重叠销售区域时,如何确定最优竞争价格策略,保证其利润最大;其次,该模型把需求量看成价格的函数,将消费者与销售商的距离看成是影响实际消费行为的重要因素纳入到消费者密度函数.     

Evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game among mobile players with random-pairing and reinforcement learning

The evolutionary spatial game in a mobile population has attracted many researchers of biological, social and economic sciences. Considering some facts observed in the real world, this paper proposes a novel spatial evolutionary snowdrift game model with movable players. In this model, one player interacts only with the nearest neighbor in each turn, and makes decision in a reinforcement learning way. In a very large range of the parameters moving ability enhances cooperation, but under some special condition, velocity heavily depresses cooperation. Some explanations have also been given out by investigating the strategy-change behavior of players. The findings may be helpful in understanding cooperative behavior in natural and social systems consisting of mobile agents.     

Geometry of ‘standoffs’ in lattice models of the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games

The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games are the main theoretical constructs used to study the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation. In large, well-mixed populations, mean-field models predict a stable equilibrium abundance of all defectors in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and a stable mixed-equilibrium of cooperators and defectors in the Snowdrift game. In the spatial extensions of these games, which can greatly modify the fates of populations (including allowing cooperators to persist in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, for example), lattice models are typically used to represent space, individuals play only with their nearest neighbours, and strategy replacement is a function of the differences in payoffs between neighbours. Interestingly, certain values of the cost–benefit ratio of cooperation, coupled with particular spatial configurations of cooperators and defectors, can lead to ‘global standoffs’, a situation in which all cooperator–defector neighbours have identical payoffs, leading to the development of static spatial patterns. We start by investigating the conditions that can lead to ‘local standoffs’ (i.e., in which isolated pairs of neighbouring cooperators and defectors cannot overtake one another), and then use exhaustive searches of small square lattices (4×4$4\times 4$ and 6×6$6\times 6$) of degree k=3,k=4$k=3,k=4$, and k=6$k=6$, to show that two main types of global standoff patterns–‘periodic’ and ‘aperiodic’–are possible by tiling local standoffs across entire spatially structured populations. Of these two types, we argue that only aperiodic global standoffs are likely to be potentially attracting, i.e., capable of emerging spontaneously from non-standoff conditions. Finally, we use stochastic simulation models with comparatively large lattices (100×100$100\times 100$) to show that global standoffs in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games do indeed only (but not always) emerge under the conditions predicted by the small-lattice analysis.     

Role of recommendation in spatial public goods games

We study the role of recommendation in a co-evolutionary public goods game in which groups can recommend their members for establishment of new relationships with individuals outside the current group according to group quality. Intriguingly, for square lattices and ER graphs there exists optimal group quality for recommendation that induces positive feedback between cooperation and recommendation. Snapshots of spatial patterns of cooperators, defectors, recommended cooperators and recommended defectors show that if group quality is appropriate for recommendation, cooperation and recommendation can simultaneously emerge. Moreover, we find that local recommendation improves cooperation more than global recommendation. As an extension, we also present results for Barabási–Albert networks. The positive effect of recommendation on cooperation for Barabási–Albert networks is independent of group quality. Our results provide an insight into the evolution of cooperation in real social systems.